If old films of end view of shuttle landings are viewed for the tail rudder simetry it would probably not be noticable unless fully extended for to derive full braking power since there is also a drag shute open as well on landing. see photo at http://trc.dfrc.nasa.gov/Gallery/Photo/STS-111/Small/EC02-0131-4.jpg of STS-111 Landing.

Rudder action not noticable due to photo side angle of view. My comments from a day ago on this were.

If this were an Electronical device it would have been tested and retested for quality. So what does that say about mechanical designed components for the shuttle.
I would say look at them all this as we have seen includes thus far Tiles, Foam, main engine pitting, and other major defects corrected over the years.

I see from the marsnews site side bar that the x-43 scramjet hydrogen (air)oxygen engine is being readied for a saturday test flight. Has there been any thought into using this technology with other fuel types possibly Kerosene in the first stage with lox assist to start followed by the rest of the flight being powered by incoming air.

So what are we getting from the Space survey on near earth object that cost 3.5 million dollars?? as stated in the sky is falling article on the side bar.

I hope the research testing code used to design safe spacecrafts from the MSFC project will have some quality assurance for mechanical parts also.

I live in Florida and have seen the shuttle land several times..This report really puts things in perspective......The people that work on preparing the shuttle shouldn't. As a lot of them seem to come right out of the orange groves,if you get my drift....many and I say many can't even speak english !!!No wonder the gears are wrong...NASA has not been in my opinion hiring really top notch people...Even the smallest job when it comes to space-flight,should require at least a full high-school education with a heavy training regime....but like all industries...the pay for alot of these jobs are too low for the type of work required..so guess what job pool they go after ?...Thats right...you and I know the answer !!!And it really sickens me when we have qualified personnel to handle these important jobs...Nasa better get its.." you know what " together because our manned spaceflight program cannot survive another disaster....Go back to the ideals of Apollo and start there...Sometimes I wonder if our Space Program would be farther ahead if we still only had dial telephones and 3 channels on the TV..Lol..............Thanks

I to believe that you are correct with the assumptions on the work force available. I have never seen the shuttle land live, have only seen them on TV; though it is my understanding that the Pease Air force runway is able to handle the shuttle landing here in NH but has never been done.

The Space Shuttle has had a fatal flaw since its early design phase: it HAS a rudder.

A winged vehicle is a very bad idea for a space vehicle, for many, many reasons. It "feels" right to the casual observer, b/c it's rooted in the familiar. However, technical drawbacks (presented below in no particular order) far outweigh any potential advantages:

1) Wings (which are completely extraneous until the last few minutes of a mission) represent approximately 1/3 of the weight of the vehicle. More weight means more cost, more momentum to overcome on reentry, more propellant required to reach LEO, and therefore higher safety risk (astronauts sitting on an even bigger firecracker).

2) Wings present an unnecessary lateral control problem during launch. Wings still generate unwanted "lift" during launch, so this effect must be compensated for in the design of the propulsion and external tank mating systems. This adds extra complexity necessitated by a bad design decision.

3) Wings (especially on a vehicle as big as the Shuttle) force the reentry surfaces to be exposed on launch. Instead, the entire reentry VEHICLE should be enclosed in a protective shell as long as possible. Optimally, the reentry vehicle should serve one and only one purpose: safe reentry. Even if cost concerns force multiple uses for the reentry vehicle, the reentry SURFACE should remained sheathed until right before reentry.

4) Wings unnecessarily complicate the reentry signature of the vehicle. A geometry that's good for gliding near sea level is a bad geometry for heat dissipation at reentry.

5) Wings *require* active control on reentry (without the active control, you're toast). The somewhat self-righting shape of a capsule would be much more desirable.

I have heard far too many Shuttle spokespeople wear its complexity as a badge of honor. This is *completely* misguided. Here's hoping that in 10 years, we'll all be bragging about the elegant simplicity of CEV.

Jake - I do not share your views on the Shuttle workforce. By most accounts, there are LOTS of people working for NASA who are passionate about their jobs. Assuming you don't work for NASA, how many people do you come across on a day to day basis that are truly passionate about their work? Personally, I've encountered a precious few in my own career (I've never worked for NASA, either directly or indirectly).

I think it's unfair to fault today's NASA's workforce for a bureaucratic design-by-committee that occurred over 35 years ago:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle#The_Shuttle_decision
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/contents.htm

(BTW, I haven't read the second link yet - I am eager to read it after posting this).

When you're working Shuttle, excessive complexity comes with the territory (see my prior post for just one example). This complexity can't just be "managed away" or somehow fixed by a hypothetical superior workforce without a complete redesign. We've learned a lot of good lessons the hard way on Shuttle. Let's not place misguided and unproductive blame on the dedicated folks working their cans off to make this thing fly against all odds.